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Abstract--This paper summarizes the development history and technical highlights of the 
Space Shuttle Orbiter Drag Chute Program.  Data and references are given on the design, 
development, and testing of the system, plus several interesting operational issues and 
solutions. 
The last Shuttle flight was completed in 2011 and all the Orbiters have now become museum 
pieces.  Before all the data from system development and the 86 Orbiter Drag Chute (ODC) 
operational  landings is lost or forgotten, it may be useful to summarize it here and to identify 
data sources for future reference.  Much has been written about various aspects of the program, 
and this summary has attempted to cite many such references to make available more detailed 
information.   
The ODC program was a high-visibility NASA program that afforded the opportunity to 
thoroughly engineer and test the chute system, far beyond so many of today’s tight-budget 
programs.  So the ODC program was extremely informative--it provided a wide scope of 
information including protective door jettison issues and solutions, wind tunnel data and analyses 
on chute stability and drag behind a huge and rather blunt forebody, component and system 
reuse, and chute cleaning methods. Technology and data created have aided several current and 
past parachute programs, and will continue to do so in the future.   
The original Orbiter preliminary design included a drag parachute-- it was deleted early to save 
weight.  But after the 1987 Challenger accident and during the program redefinition phase that 
followed, Astronaut John Young presented a strong case for enhancing landing safety by adding 
nosegear steering, brake improvements, and reviving the drag chute. He widely published the 
statement 
 “The United States is betting the Space Shuttle 
Program on the crew’s ability to perform with an 
Orbiter roll-out system that is, at best, intolerant 
of routine aircraft operating problems such as 
single tire leaks, nosegear steering malfunctions, 
or unexpected crosswinds”.   
His argument won out and the ODC was adopted.  
John J. Kennedy of JSC was appointed Subsystem 
Manager and held that position throughout the 
program.  Requirements were defined in Rockwell 
International Procurement Specification MC621-
0076.  Irvin Aerospace (now Airborne Systems, a 
Fig. 1- Discovery Landing With ODC 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20130010383 2019-08-31T00:11:42+00:00Z
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division of HDT Global) was awarded the development contract in 1988.  The system was 
designed and developed, then introduced on the May 16, 1992 maiden flight of Endeavour (STS-
49), 47 launches into the program.  The other Orbiters were soon retrofitted to include the system 
as well (Fig 1).   
The best choice for the Orbiter drag parachute was determined to be a single conventional 
ribbon canopy similar to the SR-71 (40 ft diameter), but with extensive use of Kevlar (in place of 
Nylon) in the structure of the chute to save weight and volume (Ref 1and 2).  Also certain 
shaping modifications were incorporated to improve the efficiency of the drag-producing surface 
(Ref 3 and 4). 
A pyrotechnic mortar was designed to fire and deploy the 9 ft. diameter pilot chute into clean 
air far behind the Orbiter, so it could pull the main canopy aft of the severe wake region for 
positive inflation and good drag.  The Orbiter fuselage was considered equivalent to a 25 ft. 
diameter forebody.   
Wind tunnel tests were conducted to determine how far aft need the main parachute canopy be 
to produce respectable drag, and a riser length of 87 ft was shown to be satisfactory (Ref 5).  
With a maximum deployment velocity of 230 knots, a main chute design limit load of 100200 lb 
with dispersions was established.   
The Vertical Motion Simulator (VMS) at NASA’s Ames Research Center produced some of 
the most revealing and valuable information on usage of the ODC.  This is the 6 degree-of-
freedom facility where much of the astronaut training for landing was conducted.  It has a high-
fidelity cockpit with flying qualities like the Orbiter.  The VMS was the perfect tool to evaluate 
the drag chute and to develop landing procedures.  It could simulate wind conditions and failure 
conditions such as control system problems and blown tires (Ref 5).       
The Orbiter normally touches down and rolls a long way with its nose high. It was desired to 
deploy the drag chute as early after touchdown as possible to make it most effective.  But since 
the riser is attached to the Orbiter so high on the tail, the sudden application of a high parachute 
drag force at that high attach point tends to pull the nose even further up, increasing the angle of 
attack and causing the landing Orbiter to skip off and go airborne again.  Not good.   
So reefing was incorporated into the parachute design to allow early deployment while limiting 
the force fed into that high point on the tail structure.  Reefing allowed the canopy to inflate only 
to a limited drag value, then after a preset time delay (and further slowdown) allowed full 
inflation. This configuration and the technique of initiating chute deployment after main gear 
touchdown and just as the nose starts to drop (derotation) got the chute out sufficiently early with 
minimum crew workload.  After initial reefed inflation, the 
Orbiter decelerated for 3.7 sec. and then the chute disreefed 
and was allowed to fully inflate.  In this manner, the maximum 
load applied to the Orbiter was controlled and limited.  The 
VMS was used to develop and validate this configuration.  The 
chute was kept attached until the Orbiter slowed to 40-80 
knots, when it was jettisoned. 
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The parachute stowage compartment is located in the tail section just below the vertical of the 
Orbiter, where the airstream passes on either side of the compartment and aids in the deployment 
of the door and pilot chute.  The pilot chute mortar faces aftward as shown in Figure 2.  When it 
fires, it shears the rivets that hold the metallic cover on and the pilot chute then proceeds to full 
stretch and inflates in about 1.0 sec.  The force produced by the inflated pilot chute (about 4200 
lb) applies tension to the 2 cut-knives, that sever the Kevlar cords holding the 130lb main chute 
pack in the compartment.  The main chute pack is then accelerated aftward at 30 to 40 gees, so 
clearance with the main engine bells is assured.     
Before all that happens, the compartment door must be removed.  The door has a unique 
jettison feature whereby it swings open on 
breakaway hinges by force from firing the 
mortar.  The door is just a lightweight aluminum 
machining with TPS on it, with a total weight of 
about 12lb.  Strangely, the machining ended up 
looking very much like the door on the Design 
Group repro machine (Fig 3).  
The door swings open under the force of the 
pilot chute pack emerging from the mortar to 
approximately 45 degrees at which point the 
hinges disengage and the door becomes a free-
flying projectile.  The hinge breakaway point is 
carefully defined to ensure the door trajectory 
carries it aftward  (relative to the Orbiter) 
between the starboard OMS engine pod and the 
main engine bells, ensuring no contact.  The 
door then trails the Orbiter and frisbees along 
behind it until it hits the runway and slides to a stop.  It has been surprising to note how the 
flying door often defies gravity and flies formation with the Orbiter for much longer than 
predicted.     
Initially the door was to be opened by a reusable actuator, but the weight of such a system was 
prohibitive.  And when the concept of using the action of the pilot chute mortar was considered, 
it became apparent that the door would be pushed open so fast that arresting its angular velocity 
would be difficult.  Thus the breakaway hinge and expendable door.  The problem then became 
how to control the door’s point of breakaway so it would be jettisoned along a narrow corridor to 
avoid contacting the Orbiter OMS engines, main engine bells, and vehicle structure.  Analyses to 
determine the hinge dimensions to optimize the breakaway point were not adequate because of 
complex deflections in the hardware.  So static tests were repeatedly run using a pneumatic 
mortar, and hinge dimensions were varied to reach an acceptable configuration.  These tests (Ref 
6) produced a highly predictable and repeatable near-field door trajectory until clear of the 
Orbiter, but after that, the door flew where it wanted to.  It was jettisoned to the starboard side, 
but sometimes ended up trailing the Orbiter on the port side.  And once, it contacted the inflated 
pilot chute, but caused no damage.    
Fig 3-Compartment Door 
Fig 2-ODC Installation 
4 
 
The parachute system, including the compartment and door, was flight-certified by 8 
deployments behind a landing B-52 at Dryden (Fig 4)(Ref 7).  
Obviously we could not duplicate the Orbiter’s blunt forebody, 
high attach point, or even the maximum landing velocity, 
however deployment, inflation, reefing, and door behavior were 
verified by those successful tests prior to installation on the 
Orbiter.  
But the B-52 tests revealed that we were far off in our reefed 
canopy loads.  The first 2 B-52 tests showed we were producing 
first stage loads that would be expected for 27% reefing, whereas we had sized the reefing line to 
expect 40%.  This was a surprise to all involved including Sandia and Knacke, himself.  Also the 
time from disreef to full inflation was much shorter than predicted by conventional methods.  So 
the final reefing line length was resized and verified by continued testing. 
Another notable occurrence was tearing damage on the leading edge of the Kevlar vent band of 
the main canopy in 3 tests.  The design was changed to go back to Nylon to accommodate the 
concentration of load on the leading edge during inflation.  This damage was showing up at 
approximately 65% of design limit load.  Other more minor changes/improvements were 
incorporated during this test series, including rigging, abrasion protection, and local beefups. 
  Although the Orbiter wake, max deployment velocity, and attach height above the runway 
could not be duplicated by using the B-52, it was an extremely valuable test series.  To complete 
ODC verification, 10 operational Orbiter landings, under varying conditions (primarily 
deployment timing and speedbrake schedule) fully certified the ODC, starting with STS-49. 
An interesting problem in parachute technology came up after a few flights.  Our inability to 
initially test the drag chute system in a wake environment simulating the Orbiter led to a problem 
with parachute stability.  The parachute canopy was originally designed with a low porosity to 
ensure positive inflation in the extreme wake field trailing the landing Orbiter.  This was 
consciously decided at the time of Knacke’s famous statement in 1989 
 “The worst thing that can happen to a parachute engineer is for his parachute to not open 
while the world is watching.” 
 Low porosity encourages inflation in a strong wake field so we 
leaned that way.  But, of course, low porosity also causes a 
parachute to want to fly at an angle displaced from the direction 
of airflow and that seemed to be the instability we were 
experiencing.  On the early Orbiter flights the drag chute was 
found to seek out a stable position of about 7 degrees to one side 
or the other, causing extra pilot workload.  Since observed 
inflation seemed to be very positive, it was judged that the 
canopy porosity could be safely increased to make the chute 
more stable.   
With advice and invaluable help from Sandia, we took some 
Fig 4-B-52 Test 
Fig 5-ODC IN Wind Tunnel 
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parachutes to the very large 80 by 120 ft wind tunnel at Ames and experimented with various 
schemes to increase the stability of the canopy (Fig 5).  The most effective means was found to 
be increasing canopy porosity by simply 
incrementally cutting ribbons out of the canopy 
at key locations and measuring canopy 
oscillation.  A small, lightweight sensor 
 
 
was placed in the center vent area to indicate by means of tracking photography the canopy 
excursions (angular oscillations) at the various porosities tested.  The result was that by 
removing 5 of the 97 concentric ribbons, increasing the total porosity from 16% to 
approximately 20%, stability was excellent (Fig 6) in the tunnel and loss of drag was an 
acceptable 7-8%.   This change was incorporated and all subsequent Orbiter landings have been 
free of the stability issue. 
An alternate approach was also tested whereby the canopy was permanently reefed.  This 
worked equally well with the increased porosity option, but resulted in much more drag loss—
perhaps as much as 20%.  The 95% permanently reefed version actually flew on one Orbiter 
flight. 
Interesting data on measured reefing line tension and canopy pull-down forces was also 
produced in these wind tunnel tests.  This wind tunnel activity is covered by Ref 8.  
Another interesting finding during the 86 landing career of the ODC was that on 3 occasions, 
up to 4 horizontal ribbons were ripped out in the crown area of the main canopy.  After entering 
service in 1992, these happened 1999, 2001, and 2009 after 47, 59, and 77 otherwise damage-
free landings.  This caused no performance degradation, but in accord with manned spacecraft 
imperative, extensive failure analysis was carried out each time.  The initial and continuing 
common observation was that the vent tended to snap back following canopy stretch, no doubt 
contacting crown ribbons and causing the damage.  A hint of this possibility was noted during 
the B-52 testing, when it was noted that as inflation begins, the skirt takes in a gulp of air and 
Fig 6-Stability before and after mod 
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expands first.  This has a tendency to causes the upper 
canopy to be blanketed and to be drawn forward into the 
wake of the skirt.  Then as the canopy is stretched and the 
break tie between the vent and deployment bag separates, 
a snapback can occur, resulting in the rather massive vent 
construction to damage the more fragile ribbons.   
Parachute engineers are accustomed to “random” acts of 
parachute mischief under usually varying conditions, but 
here is an application where 86 deployments occurred at 
practically identical deployment conditions and all with 
excellent photo coverage.  All chutes were alike.  All 
packing/rigging was alike.  Why did it happen on these 3 
flights?  Why didn’t it happen on every flight?  As Knacke 
often said--- 
“If you don’t like the fickleness (or some such word) of 
parachutes, why don’t you go into the stock market?”  
 It’s true that mysterious incidents of damage are 
sprinkled throughout many test and operational parachute 
programs.  We parachute people know this and we are 
inclined to throw up our hands in resignation and say “Hey, it happens”.  But this rarely satisfies 
the reliability crowd or the customer. 
The wake field behind the landing Orbiter has a very positive up-swirl (Fig 7 & 8)(Ref 9) that 
results from the high-alpha wings pressing the air down against the runway, and as the wing 
passes over it, the air expands and causes a very measurable up component.  This doesn’t 
adversely affect the pilot or main canopies, but the largely unkeepered main chute riser was 
being swept up and into the wake of the speedbrake.  It was feared that the riser could damage or 
interfere with the function of the speedbrakes, so a riser sleeve was added to contain the 44 plies 
of webbing that comprised the riser into a smaller diameter bundle that is less affected by the 
local airflow.  This was very effective and the concern was eliminated. 
The only other notable issue was on John Glenn’s STS-95 flight in 1998, when the parachute 
compartment door inadvertently jettisoned at launch.  As the main engines were coming up to 
full thrust, the door was seen to come off and get caught up in the main engine plume which 
carried it down the flame bucket. So we had an Orbiter in flight without a door. This became an 
extremely uneasy situation because no one knew the condition of the now-exposed main pack 
retaining ties, or the temperature of the mortar pyro cartridge, and it suggested the chute might 
deploy at any time during the flight.  It did not deploy however, but remained in its compartment 
through orbital insertion and the entire mission.   
But, again, in true manned spacecraft fashion, many groundlings spent the next several days 
(and nights) thinking up all the horrible things that could happen if the chute inadvertently 
deployed —and of course, what to do about it.  Like what if it deployed in space, flailed around, 
and became wrapped around the vertical tail so that the rudder and speedbrakes couldn’t 
Fig 7-Riser Deflection 
 
Fig 8-Wake Field 
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function.  In such a case, would the chute burn away during entry, or hang around and cause 
approach and landing problems?  Or how about this one—what if it deployed just as the Orbiter 
was about 40 ft altitude during landing approach causing the Orbiter to touch down short of the 
runway, or at least endangering an already-difficult landing sequence?  Fortunately none of these 
things happened and landing was normal, but the chute was intentionally not deployed to avoid 
introducing uncertainties.  Post flight inspection showed signs of enough heat to melt some non-
structural Nylon on the face of the pack, but otherwise the chute and compartment were in good 
shape.  A specific cause for the anomaly was never duplicated in test, but tolerances and controls 
on rigging the door were tightened up and no further problems occurred. 
People ask if we reused the chutes.  Yes—up to 15 uses of the textile parts and 10 uses of the 
metal parts, such as the mortar.  We started out with a reusable main chute but it was heavy with 
all the extra beef designed into it.  So we made it a single use chute and knocked 40 lbs. out of 
the design.  Later we saw that the chutes still looked new after a single use and the cost of 
replacement chutes had gone up significantly.  So we ran a series of laboratory tests (Ref 10 and 
11) on materials which confirmed, with adequate controls, we could safely reuse the hardware.  
A most useful bit of data came from cycling the Kevlar suspension lines from a previously flown 
main chute at various usage levels to 50 cycles.  These tests showed an initial increase in strength 
after a number of cycles, and an extremely minor loss of strength after the full 50 cycles.  In 
addition, a tired, old 
operational F-117 drag 
chute, with similar 
construction to the 
ODC was cut up and 
tested, showing the 
effects of abrasion and 
dirt on strength of its 
63 usages to increase 
our knowledge base.   
Interesting thing is, 
we added back less 
than 1 lb—this to 
cover areas of possible 
abrasion.  And this 
slight-of-hand saved 
us about 39 lb!  By the 
end of the program, 
we had used main 
chutes up to 9 times 
and saved a ton of money.  Actually, the canopies showed so little signs of wear, the usage life 
could probably have been increased much farther.   
Aside from just trying to make the system work, an extensive program was conducted to 
develop a method of parachute canopy cleaning.  Since landing on the EAFB dry lakebed was a 
useful program option, our chutes would become loaded with dirt and grit on such occasions.  
From many past tests at Natick and other organizations, data was found that characterized 
8 
 
strength degradation in canopies due to various concentrations of dirt from widespread sources 
such as Yuma, WSMR, etc.  This was good background data and it encouraged us to carry this 
work further. 
   It was desired to have a proven cleaning method that would reclaim and allow continued use 
of the ODC.  USBI conducted tests on materials and joints from flown and dirty chutes to 
establish the level of degradation present, the best cleaning method, and the resulting end effects 
on the chutes, such as residual strength loss and shrinkage.  Spectacular photos of dirty and clean 
textile specimens up to 2000x gave great insight as to effectiveness of various cleaning methods 
(Fig 9)(Ref 12).  This effort should be useful to any program that worries about chute reuse after 
heavy dirt exposure. 
We started with the 40ft, 44 gore all-nylon SR-71 drag chute.  The ODC used Kevlar in 
primary structure and increased the suspension line/radial webbings from 4000lb to 6000lb.  The 
SR-71 used 460lb Nylon horizontal ribbons throughout, whereas the ODC used 300, 200 and 
100lb.  The ODC gores were changed to make it a conical canopy.  Overall, if one multiplies 
canopy drag by its strength, and divides by weight, the ODC was superior by a factor of 3.7.  
This, of course, ignores other factors, such as design temperatures.  Thanks anyway to new 
materials and methods.            
The ODC was used 86 times with satisfactory results.  The astronauts loved it because it gave 
an added margin of safety in the difficult process of landing that solid brick.  It has also, of 
course, saved untold dollars on brake and tire wear.   
We’ve never had a landing emergency where the ODC was called upon to save the day, but 
that big red, white, and blue canopy added color, drama, and action to the scene every time the 
beautiful bird came home.  And, of course, we kept on banking the dollars saved on those brakes 
and tires.  So here’s to John Young.  Too bad he never got to fly it.   
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